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INTRODUCTION
Over the last century, researchers and
laypeople alike have been captivated by
synaesthesia—a developmental condition
present in approximately 5% of the adult
population, where the presentation of an
“inducer” stimulus gives rise to additional
“concurrent” sensation absent from the
veridical sensory world (Ward, 2013). For
example, the most common variant is
grapheme-color synaesthesia, where letters
and digits induce concurrent sensations of
color (Day, 2005).
Early theories proposed that synaes-
thesia resulted from associative learning
between the inducer and concurrent
sensory representations (Calkins, 1893;
Claparede, 1903). Specifically, the inducer
and concurrent stimuli have been present
in a correlated, or “contingent,” fashion
in the synaesthete’s environment; hence
presentation of the inducer alone now
activates the representation of the con-
current. However, these theories have
been widely rejected. A range of structural
and functional mechanisms are proposed
by contemporary theorists, including
hyperconnectivity between brain regions
(Hubbard and Ramachandran, 2005) and
feedback disinhibition (Grossenbacher
and Lovelace, 2001), but all are united in
the assertion that “associative learning in
and of itself cannot explain synaesthesia”
(Marks and Odgaard, 2005).
Given recent evidence consistent with
learning explanations of synaesthesia, we
consider here whether the associative
account may have been dismissed prema-
turely. We suggest that common objec-
tions to this account may be rooted in
misunderstandings about what it would
predict. We consider these objections in
turn, highlighting how they are easily
countered by contemporary learning the-
ory. The objections are that synaesthetic
experiences (1) do not reflect envi-
ronmental statistics, (2) remain consis-
tent over time, (3) cannot be trained
into neurotypicals, and (4) are domain-
specific. We close by describing the
types of experiment that would provide
the associative account of synaesthesia
with the rigorous empirical assessment it
deserves.
OBJECTIONS TO AN ASSOCIATIVE
ACCOUNT
SYNAESTHETIC EXPERIENCE DOES NOT
REFLECT ENVIRONMENTAL STATISTICS
Some opponents of the associative account
suggest that the seemingly bizarre cor-
respondences synaesthetes report do not
reflect the statistics of the sensory world.
Deroy and Spence (2013a) make this argu-
ment when distinguishing between synaes-
thesia and crossmodal correspondences
experienced by the typical population.
They consider, for example, how the ten-
dency of neurotypicals to match higher
pitched sounds with smaller visual objects
could be supported by a mechanism that
tracks environmental regularities, because
a note struck from a violin will be higher
in pitch than one struck from a double
bass, and the bark of a small dog reaches
a greater frequency than that of a large
one. In contrast, they propose that synaes-
thesia evades such an explanation because
the environmental regularities it would
require do not exist.
However, while the correspondences
may not reflect the environmental con-
tingencies that we all typically experience,
assessing the associative account requires
knowledge of the sensory environment
of a particular individual across their
developmental history. In fact, in con-
trast with the view of Deroy and Spence
(2013a), Witthoft and Winawer (2013)
recently reported that the particular map-
pings between colors and letters of 11
synaesthetes may be explained with refer-
ence to toys with which they interacted as
children—such as colored magnets depict-
ing alphanumeric characters. Such studies
join an existing body of work suggest-
ing that synaesthetic mappings may in
fact reflect past (or present) environmen-
tal contingencies (e.g., Simner et al., 2005;
Witthoft and Winawer, 2006; although see
Rich et al., 2005).
Therefore, synaesthetic experience may
reflect the statistics of the sensory envi-
ronment in which synaesthetes developed
even if it does not correspond to statistical
relationships in the current environment
of the majority.
CONSISTENCY OF SYNAESTHETIC
EXPERIENCE
It has also been argued that if synaesthetic
experience arises due to environmental
correlations between inducer and concur-
rent stimuli, then exposure to the typical
environment—when inducer-concurrent
relationships are no longer present—
should give rise to “reversal learning” of
the association (Gray et al., 2006): If asso-
ciations are learned through experience,
they should also be unlearned through
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experience. Therefore, it is proposed that
the high consistency of synaesthetic expe-
rience is evidence against the associa-
tive account (although see Simner et al.,
2009; Simner and Bain, 2013; Meier et al.,
2014).
This objection displays some misun-
derstanding of the associative literature,
which does in fact predict that synaes-
thetic experience should exhibit high
consistency. To understand this predic-
tion, we must consider how reversal
learning is thought to operate. True
unlearning, or “extinction” of associa-
tions, operates over vast timescales if
it occurs at all (Baeyens et al., 1995).
“Unlearning” more typically involves
the establishment of new, alternative
associations. As with the formation of
first-learned associations, such second-
learned associations will only be formed
if there is a systematic, i.e., contingent,
new relationship in the environment
(Dickinson and Charnock, 1985).
Furthermore, while first-learned associa-
tions formed with novel stimuli generalize
well to other contexts, subsequently
acquired associations, which give rise
to ambiguity, demonstrate contextual
specificity (Bouton, 1993, 1994; Nelson,
2002).
Consider a grapheme-color synaesthete
who associates the letter “A” with the
color red. The formation of a new com-
peting association would only occur if
there is a systematic pairing between “A”
and another stimulus. If this does occur,
for example, “A” is contingently paired
with the color black, the synaesthete will
still maintain the first-learned “A”-red
association alongside context-dependent
“A”-black associations. Thus, testing in
contexts alternative to that in which the
“A”-black association was learned (e.g.,
the dark computer cubicles at universities
where many synaesthetes are assessed) will
still highlight only context-independent A-
red associations.
Therefore, an associative account in
fact predicts that first-learned associations
mediating synaesthetic experience should
influence perception with a high degree
of consistency, although consistency will
be determined by the timecourse of rel-
evant learning in combination with the
similarity of training and test contexts for
second-learned associations.
SYNAESTHESIA CANNOT BE “TRAINED INTO”
NEUROTYPICALS
Others propose that if synaesthesia is gen-
erated by learned associations, training
in neurotypicals should generate similar
experiences. The associative account is
often rejected on the basis that some stud-
ies fail to find a change in the neurotypical
participant’s phenomenology after such
training (see Deroy and Spence, 2013b;
Rothen and Meier, 2014 for reviews).
Notably training studies have been suc-
cessful in inducing behavioral changes that
are akin to those seen in synaesthesia.
For example, previous researchers have
reported the “synaesthetic-Stroop effect,”
where synaesthetes are slower to respond
to graphemes (Dixon et al., 2000; Nikolic
et al., 2007) or tones (Ward et al., 2006)
when they are presented with colors that
are incongruent with the concurrent they
typically elicit. Exposing neurotypical sub-
jects to arbitrary pairings in the labora-
tory generates similar interference effects
post-training (e.g., Howells, 1944; Rothen
et al., 2011; Colizoli et al., 2012; Kusnir and
Thut, 2012).
Even if the phenomenology of synaes-
thetes differs from that of a neurotypi-
cal after training, it does not follow that
distinct mechanisms mediate the effects.
Phenomenological sensation that a con-
current stimulus is present is likely to
be determined by the strength of acti-
vation of the perceptual representation,
which is likely to differ in the two sce-
narios. Namely, the amount of expe-
rience presented in a typical training
study is dwarfed by that of a child in
their developmental environment (Cohen
Kadosh et al., 2005), and second-learned
associations—which likely mediate neu-
rotypical training effects in adults—often
require more exposure before acquisition
(Myers et al., 2000). Lesser opportunity to
learn would result in a weaker association
(Hull, 1943). Therefore, any differences
in phenomenology may be due to imbal-
anced strength of “inducer”-“concurrent”
associations, resulting in lesser activation
of “concurrent” representations in neu-
rotypical training studies (note that sim-
ilar explanations address the differences
in longevity of behavioral changes; Deroy
and Spence, 2013b).
In summary, to test whether experi-
ences akin to those of a synaesthete can
be trained into a neurotypical, future stud-
ies should examine how the induction
of stronger associations modulates effects
(Rothen et al., 2011).
DOMAIN-SPECIFICITY
The associative account proposes that the
learning mechanisms generating synaes-
thetic experience operate across domains.
The final common objection suggests that
this account “fails. . . because it cannot
address. . . why only specific classes of
stimuli are able to induce synaesthesia”
(p. 4, Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001).
For example, many synaesthetes report
cultural artifacts as inducers—like let-
ters, musical notes and words—with fewer
reporting correspondences between, say,
touch and taste. One might argue that
associative explanations fail to account for
why some variants of synaesthesia are so
common, and others so rare (Marks and
Odgaard, 2005).
When considering this objection it
is first important to note that while
certain types of synaesthesia are more
common, it is likely that individual
synaesthetes will present with multi-
ple types (Ramachandran and Hubbard,
2001). Second, while the learning mech-
anisms generating the condition may
be domain-general, it does not follow
that effects should be present across all
domains. For example, to learn about
stimuli they must be processed, there-
fore environmental stimuli to which chil-
dren are encouraged to attend for lengthy
periods—such as letters when learn-
ing to read—would be recipients of a
learning advantage (Mackintosh, 1975).
Furthermore, while associative theories
analyze general processes of excitation and
inhibition between cognitive representa-
tions, they do not deny the existence of
certain anatomical constraints on gener-
ality; such that some associations may be
easier to form if representations are located
in neighboring cortical regions (Bargary
and Mitchell, 2008). However, acknowl-
edging such constraints does not detract
from the domain-generality of the mecha-
nism proposed; it is domain-general learn-
ing mechanisms that are atypical, not the
anatomical constraints on generality (note
that under this account any genetic contri-
butions would act solely upon the opera-
tion of the learning mechanisms).
Frontiers in Psychology | Perception Science July 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 702 | 2
Yon and Press Synaesthesia and associative learning
Therefore, a domain-general mecha-
nism can generate effects that do not oper-
ate across all domains.
TESTING THE ASSOCIATIVE ACCOUNT
Given that objections to the associative
account have been arguably premature, we
propose that it should now receive rigor-
ous empirical assessment.
To date, learning accounts have been
assessed by either considering whether
contingencies existed in the developmen-
tal environment that could have gener-
ated inducer-concurrent associations or
conducting training studies in neurotyp-
icals. These studies provide an excellent
starting point for testing the plausibil-
ity of the associative account, and recent
rigorous examinations provide evidence
consistent with learned origins of the asso-
ciations (Witthoft and Winawer, 2013;
Rothen and Meier, 2014). However, there
are two problems with using these strate-
gies in isolation. First, the former rests
heavily on self-report. It is likely that many
of the contingencies of interest would have
been present during the period of child-
hood amnesia (Bauer and Larkina, 2013),
and even if they were present later in life
it is often difficult to assess these claims
systematically; for example, whether con-
tingencies were strong enough to produce
learning, and conversely whether absence
of evidence is really evidence of absence.
Second, neither approach can identify the
precise mechanism by which synaesthetic
experience emerges—namely what is spe-
cial about synaesthetes, and why, given the
same environmental input, typical indi-
viduals do not develop such unusual expe-
riences.
We suggest that the time has come
to investigate systematically whether and
how learning mechanisms differ in synaes-
thetes. Some studies already raise the pos-
sibility that grapheme-color synaesthetes
possess enhanced visual learning abili-
ties (Rothen et al., 2012, 2013; Pritchard
et al., 2013; Ward et al., 2013; although
see Gross et al., 2011). However, while
advantages may be due to intrinsic dif-
ferences in associative mechanisms, it is
equally plausible that the experience of
having synaesthesia causes these indi-
viduals to direct more attention to the
modality of their inducer/concurrent (see
Mackintosh, 1975). More targeted tests
looking specifically at associative processes
in synaesthetes (e.g., the magnitude of
blocking, contingency, context, and latent
inhibition effects, Dickinson, 1981) rela-
tive to neurotypicals, across a range of
domains, and without competition from
the synaesthetic domain (domains will
need to be selected carefully to avoid con-
founding the causes and effects of synaes-
thesia), are thus needed to investigate the
associative account. For example, the atyp-
ical correspondences seen in synaesthesia
could be accounted for if this group are
“fast learners”—requiring fewer pairings
or weaker contingencies to form associa-
tions between stimulus features.
CONCLUSION
The theory that synaesthesia emerges
through associative learning may have
been dismissed prematurely. Objections
to this account frequently miss the sub-
tleties of contemporary associative theory.
Therefore, we propose that it is time to re-
consider this account as a viable explana-
tion of synaesthesia and give it the rigorous
empirical assessment that it deserves.
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